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JOHANSEN v. CALIFORNIA STATE AUTOMOBILE
ASSOCIATION: HAS CALIFORNIA ADOPTED
STRICT LIABILITY FOR AN INSURER'S
FAILURE TO SETTLE?
The typical liability insurance policy contains a provision requiring
the insurer to defend the named insured' in actions filed against him
within the scope of the policy's coverage. Such policies also invariably

establish fixed liability limits, specific dollar amounts above which the
company will not be contractually liable. If, as is often the case, the
plaintiff makes a settlement demand that is within those policy limits,
the insurance company attorney named to represent the insured may
find himself confronted with a serious conflict of interest. It is in the

insured's interest to accept the demand, thus protecting his personal
assets from a verdict in excess of the policy limits. On the other hand, it

may be actuarially unsound for the insurer to accept the settlement
demand, particularly when liability is questionable or the extent of
damages uncertain.
Various writers have argued that the best way to eliminate the
potential conflict of interest is to adopt a doctrine of strict liability in this

area. 2 Under such a doctrine an insurance company which refused a
settlement demand within the policy limits would be strictly liable for
any amount in excess of such limits awarded against the insured in the
trial. This result would obtain regardless of the insurer's good faith or

the reasonableness of its decision not to settle. In 1967, the California
Supreme Court in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 3 explicated at length
1. For a discussion of who may be afforded protection under a policy of liability
insurance, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober, 10 Cal. 3d 193, 514 P.2d 953,
110 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973) (Tobriner, J.).
2. See, e.g., Comment, Insurance-Liability of Insurer for Yudgment in Excess
of Policy Limits, 48 MICH. L. REv. 95, 102 (1949); Comment, Approaching Strict Liability of Insurer for Refusing to Settle Within Policy Limits, 47 NEB. L. REv. 705
(1968); Note, An Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qualified or Absolute?, 41 S.
CAL. L. REv. 120, 138-42 (1968); Comment, Insurance Carrier'sDuty to Settle: Strict
Liability in Excess Liability Cases?, 6 SETON HALL. L. REv. 662 (1975); Note, Excess
Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REv.
475, 482-85 (1966); Note, Insurer's Refusal to Settle-A Proposal for Imposition of
Liability Above Policy Limits, 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041-42 (1951); 13 U. Cm. L. REv.
105, 109 (1945).
3. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
[8951
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the merits of strict liability in this context4 but stopped short of adopting
such a doctrine outright. 5
In the recent case of Johansen v. California State Automobile
Association Inter-Insurance Bureau,6 the court answered plaintiff's arguments which urged the adoption of strict liability by saying that it was
not necessary to resolve the issue. 7 This note, however, will argue that
Johansen and other decisions since Crisci have in fact resolved the issue
in favor of an unannounced policy of strict liability for failure to settle
within the policy limits. Although this result may in some respects be
consistent with good public policy and, most important, may minimize
the conflict of interest problem described above, it also raises a variety of
practical problems, perhaps the most important of which is the possibility that this new leverage could be abused by a plaintiff acting in bad
faith. This note will examine Johansen and some of the cases preceding
it in detail and suggest one way of dealing with the problems raised by
what amounts to an unannounced policy of strict liability.
Definitions
For purposes of this discussion, the terms below will be defined as
follows:
Excess liability cases: those cases which consist of three basic
elements: 1) a demand 8 to settle within the policy limits; 2) a rejection
of the demand; and 3) a judgment in excess of the policy limits.
Excess liability: a state of events requiring the insurer to pay the
portions of a judgment that exceed the policy limits.
The second suit: the lawsuit--often called the "bad faith suit"9which the insured or his assignee files against the insurer for failing to
4. Id. at 430-31, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See text accompanying
notes 81-83 infra.
5. See 66 Cal. 2d at 431-32, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
6. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
7. Id. at 17 n.6, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
8. Although courts often use the term "offer" to refer to the plaintiff's settlement
demand, personal injury and defense attorneys almost uniformly use the term "demand"
to describe the plaintiff's offer and reserve the term "offer" for the defendant's offer.
Interview with Joseph W. Rogers, Jr. of Pettit, Evers & Martin, in San Francisco, California, Jan. 8, 1976.
9. At times, certain jurisdictions have imposed liability for the excess judgment
after a finding that the insurer has been guilty of bad faith. Although this finding is
not now a requirement for the imposition of excess liability in California, the second
suit is still often referred to as the "bad faith suit." When the term "bad faith" is used,
it sometimes carries a layperson's meaning rather than a particular legal meaning. For
a discussion of several of these decisions, see Comment, Insurance Carrier'sDuty to Settle:Strict Liability in Excess Liability Cases?, 6 SETON HALL L. REv. 662, 669-75

(1975).
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accept the plaintiff's settlement demand. This cause of action arises
from a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,1 0 which is
implied in almost all contracts.
Second suit perspective: a perspective created when all three excess
liability elements are present and a second suit has been filed.
Reservation of rights: an express communication to the insured
explaining that although the insurer is offering a defense, this offer does

not amount to an admission that coverage exists.

The insurer thus

reserves the right to raise the issue of coverage at a later time.

The Road to Strict Liability: California Case Law
Before Johansen

The first supreme court decision in California's excess liability case
law was the 195811 decision in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.' 2 The court in Comunale held that the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing' 3 requires that
[Ain insurer, who wrongfully declines to defend and who refuses
to accept a reasonable settlement within the policy limits in violation of its duty to consider in good faith the interest of the insured
in the settlement, is liable for the entire judgment against the insured even if it exceeds the policy limits.' 4
By requiring both a wrongful refusal to defend and a refusal to
accept a reasonable settlement, the court seemed, if anything, to be

pointing away from strict liability.
Two years later, the court of appeal in Davy v. Public National
10. For example, the California Supreme Court has described this implied covenant in the following manner: "There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the right
of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." Comunale v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958).
11. The first court of appeal decision in this area was filed in the previous year.
The court referred to decisions from other jurisdictions and found the insurer liable, announcing that the test of liability was bad faith rather than negligence alone. Brown
v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 688-89, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957).
12. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). The pedestrian Comunales were struck
and injured by Sloan, whose insurer was Traders & General Insurance Company. Because Sloan did not own the truck he was driving at the time of the accident, his insurer
declined coverage and refused to defend. The Comunales made a demand to settle
within the policy limits. Sloan informed Traders of the demand (which he could not
pay) and asked that they assume the defense and settlement. Traders refused, and the
trial resulted in a judgment in excess of the policy limits. Sloan assigned his cause of
action against Traders to the Comunales, who successfully maintained this bad faith action against the insurer. See id. at 657-58, 328 P.2d at 200.
13. See note 10 supra.
14. 50 Cal. 2d at 661, 328 P.2d at 202.
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Insurance Co.'5 discussed the meaning of good faith and fair dealing
and said the exercise of good faith requires "an equal consideration of
the interests of the insured along with those of the insurer . ... 1
Most important, Davy seemed to suggest that an insurer would not be
held to excess liability if a demand was rejected in good faith. In this
regard the court stated with some particularity its interpretation of the
term "good faith":
[A]n insurer acts in good faith in rejecting an offer of settlement
after it has undertaken a reasonably diligent investigation to determine the facts of the case, is acting upon the opinion of a reasonably qualified legal advisor, and is of the honest belief that the risk
of an adverse verdict is one which it would assume if there were
no limits to its policy, providing the insured is informed of the offer
of settlement, furnished with the results of the investigation made,
and advised of the opinion upon which the rejection is based.' 7
The court in Davy explained further that liability could not be
based simply upon the failure to predict the outcome of the action,
specifying that "[n]either mistaken judgment nor unreasonable judgment is the equivalent of bad faith.' 8 The dispositive factor, said the
court, is whether the insurer would have made the same decision if there
had been no policy limits,' 9 a determination which was to be a function
of the trier of fact.2 0
The next statement of the California Supreme Court on this issue
came in 1967 in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.2 ' The opinion in
Crisci used the "determinative factor" analysis mentioned in Davy as a
touchstone, saying, "the test is whether a prudent insurer without policy
limits would have accepted the settlement offer." 2 This time, however,
15. 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960). Davy, who operated 27 taxicabs, was sued as a result of an accident between a police motorcycle and one of Davy's

cabs. Davy's insurer, Public National Insurance Company assumed the defense but rejected a demand to settle for $4,500 on a policy with $5,000 limits. The jury returned
a verdict against Davy in the amount of $24,268, and the insurance company paid the
$5,000 limits. Davy successfully sued the insurance company for the excess. See id.

at 393-94, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
16.

Id. at 395, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 492.

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 396, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 399, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
ld. at 400, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 495.

21. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). Mrs. DiMare, a tenant of Mrs. Crisci, was injured on an outside staircase when a tread gave way. Mrs.
DiMare sued Mrs. Crisci, who was defended by Security Insurance Company under a
policy with $10,000 liability limits. Security rejected a within-limits demand, part of
which Mrs. Crisci offered to pay out of personal assets. The jury awarded Mrs. DiMare
$100,000.
Security paid their limits, and Mrs. Crisci assigned her cause of action
against Security to Mrs. DiMare, who prevailed against the insurer. See id. at 427-29,
426 P.2d at 175-76, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
22. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
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the court stated that all that was required to impose excess liability was
that the insurer had known that the risk of a verdict beyond the limits
was "substantial" and had given more
consideration to its own interests
23
than to the interests of the insured.
Moreover, the court in Crisci explained that liability did not require "dishonesty, fraud, and concealment '24 but would be imposed for
"failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements, a duty
25
included within the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Further explanation was provided by the supreme court in the
1973 decision in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. 20 Although the
case did not itself present an excess liability fact situation,2 7 the notion
of the "independency of implied covenants" which the court articulated

was to become important in this area. Briefly stated, this concept
directs that although the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
imposes duties upon the insured as well as the insurer, the insurer will
not be excused from any implied duty merely because the insured has

breached such a duty on its own part. As the court concluded:
[The duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the defendant insurance companies is an absolute one... . [Tihe non23. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
24. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
25. Id., 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. This "duty to accept reasonable
settlements" language was to become determinative years later. See text accompanying
notes 32, 42, 53 & 62 infra.
Another aspect of Crisci which was to become extremely important in cases which
followed was its hindsight dictum to the effect that the size of the verdict creates an
inference as to the reasonableness of the settlement offer. 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d
at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. This language was greeted with approval in Johansen and
used as a jury instruction in Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d
783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975). See notes 36, 69-70 & accompanying text infra.
26. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). The plaintiff's
business premises were insured by the defendant insurer, Aetna Insurance Company,
against fire loss. A fire occurred, and an adjuster representing the defendant insurer
told an arson investigator the property was overinsured. Subsequently, the plaintiff was
charged with arson. The defendant demanded in writing that the plaintiff appear at the
offices of the company's legal counsel to submit to examination under oath and produce
documents for the insurer's investigation of the loss. The plaintiff's personal attorney
for the criminal charge responded by letter that he had advised his client not to make
any statements while the criminal action was pending. After the arson charges were
dismissed, the defendant insurer refused to pay on the policy because the plaintiff had
failed to appear upon request. The plaintiff prevailed in an action for breach of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 569-72, 510 P.2d at 1034-36, 108
Cal. Rptr. at 482-84. See also Note, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 25 HASTINGS U. 699 (1974).
27. The excess liability area can be seen as a subdivision of the larger area of
case law concerning allegations of bad faith against insurance companies. Thus, although this note deals specifically with the excess liability cases, most of the language
used in any of the major bad faith cases is relevant.
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performance by one party of its contractual duties cannot excuse
a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by the other
party while
the contract between them is in effect and not
28
rescinded.
This language would appear to have eliminated the assertion of
questionable conduct on the part of the insured or the insured's attorney
as a defense2 9 available to the insurer in the second suit. Such conduct
was nonetheless discussed in Johansen, but the court confined its comments to a footnote.3 0
In another 1973 decision, Garner v. American Mutual Liability
Insurance Co.,3 the court of appeal repeated the notion announced in
Crisci that actual bad faith on the part of the insurer is not required to
impose liability for judgments in excess of the policy limits, since the
insurer in any event has a duty to accept reasonable settlement demands.3 2 The significance of this particular language is discussed more
fully below.
In Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,3 3 which
preceded Johansen by only a few months, the appellate court simply
applied, for the most part, concepts introduced in the previous decisions
in -this area. For example, the opinion in Cain restated the language in
Comunale that every insurance policy contains an implied covenant
requiring that settlement demands be considered in good faith3 4 and
repeated the "prudent insurer without policy limits" test stated in
Crisci.3 As will be seen, however, the decision in Cain was important
because the court also approved "hindsight" dictum in Crisci that a jury
may properly be instructed that the size of a judgment provides an
inference as to the value of a claim. 3 6
28. 9 Cal. 3d at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal, Rptr. at 488.
29. Successful handling of claims, especially when defense of the insured is involved, requires that the insured cooperate. This cooperation is part of the mutual requirement of good faith and fair dealing. The Gruenberg decision, however, makes it
difficult to enforce such behavior.

See also Johansen v. Calif. State Auto. Ass'n Inter-

Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1970).

30.

15 Cal. 3d at 21 n.12, 538 P.2d at 752, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 296.

31.

31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).

32.

Id. at 848, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 607.

33.

47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).

Elaine Cain was injured

in an accident involving an automobile owned by Bing Woo Jew and insured by State
Farm.

Because of-a dispute over who had been driving the automobile, defendant in-

surer failed to accept a demand to settle within the policy limits.

Bing Woo Jew as-

signed part of his cause of action against the insurer to Cain, and they were finally
awarded compensatory as well as punitive damages in the bad faith action. See id. at

789-91, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05.
34. Id. at 791, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
35.

Id. at 792, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 205. See text accompanying note 22 supra.

36. The jury instruction borrowed from Crisci states: "The size of a judgment re-
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It was in the context of this body of case law that the court decided
Johansen v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance
Bureau.3 7 As explained above, -the phrase "implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing" had been interpreted up to this point to impose a

duty to accept reasonable settlement demands.

How this duty has

become the practical equivalent of strict liability can be shown by a
closer examination of the decisions in Garner and Johansen.
Garner v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.

In Garnerv. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,3" the court

of appeal ventured as far as any court prior to Johansen to impose
liability on the insurer in an excess liability situation without finding the
insurer guilty of bad faith. Garner grew out of a medical malpractice

suit against a physician who held a $100,000 malpractice liability group
policy issued by the defendant insurer. Under the provisions of the
insurance agreement, an independent medical review committee was
required to study claims to determine whether the physician had deviat-

ed from accepted medical practice. The understanding was that an
insurer would not settle unless there was a finding by the committee that
the physician's actions constituted malpractice.

In Garner, such a

committe determined that the physician was not guilty of malpractice,
and the insurer consequently declined a settlement demand for the

policy limits. The result in the main suit was nevertheless a judgment
of $225,000 against the physician.
Subsequently, the physician brought an action against his insurer
claiming bad faith refusal to settle within the policy limits. His complaint asked for $625,000, an amount which included the excess as well
as additional compensatory damages. On appeal from a trial verdict for

the insurer, the court of appeal ruled against the defendant insurer, and
the supreme court declined to hear the case. 39
covered in a personal injury action, when it exceeds the policy limits, although not conclusive, presents an inference that the value of the claim is equivalent to the amount
of the judgment, and the acceptance of an offer within those limits is the most reasonable method of dealing with the claim." Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967) quoted in 47 Cal. App. 3d at 79697, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09.
Some defense attorneys feel this so-called "hindsight" instruction has the practical
effect of imposing strict liability because a jury in the second suit has difficulty distinguishing between an inference and a presumption and almost invariably agrees with the
previous jury (which returned a verdict for the plaintiff). Address by Robert T. Lynch,
San Francisco Claim Manager's Council Monthly Meeting, in San Francisco, California,
May 8, 1975.
37. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
38. 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
39. Garner was not cited in Johansen, most likely because the presence of the
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An important aspect of Garner was that the insurer was held liable
even though there had been clearly no finding of bad faith on its part in
refusing the settlement demand:
The trial court found, inter alia, that the malpractice case had
been fully and capably investigated . . . that it was concluded in
good faith. . . that there was no reasonable likelihood of a verdict
in favor of [plaintiff] . . . defendant concluded again in good
faith, after review of the case that, even if [the insurer] were held
liable, the verdict would not go over $100,000 . . . . The trial
court further found, inter alia, that the rejection of the settlement
offer . . . and the refusal to make a counteroffer would have occurred even if there had been no limit at all on the insurance company's liability; and that40 there was no bad faith or negligence in
the handling of the case.
With this record, it is difficult to view the conduct of the insurer in
this case as having failed to satisfy the company's contractual obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. In fact, the appellate court recognized
that there had been insufficient evidence of bad faith. 4' Nonetheless,
the court decided that the major issue was whether or not the insurer
was liable for breach of a duty to accept reasonable settlement demands.4 2 Apparently, if the demand to settle was reasonable, then the
insurer had an unqualified duty to accept it. This duty had been
breached, the court found, because the insurer had relied on the findings
of a medical review society that there had been no malpractice, rather
than making an independent evaluation of the case.43
There was no finding, however, that the demand would have been
accepted if there had been an independent evaluation. In fact, the
record indicates that it is likely the insurer would still have declined to
settle in such a case.4 4 Therefore, there was no causal connection
between failing to evaluate the case independently and the excess judgment.
The court explained its somewhat curious holding as follows:
medical review committee complicated the fact situation, making questionable any use
of the case as precedent in other fact situations. The decision in Garner is valuable,
however, because it illustrates the length to which the courts will go to return a verdict
in favor of the insured. Justice Richardson, who concurred in the Garner decision, took
a seat on the supreme court in time to concur in Johansen.
40. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
41. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
42. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (1973).
43. Id. at 849, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
44. "The trial court found, inter alia, that the malpractice case had been fully and
capably investigated .......
Id. at 847, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
Also, the trial attorneys for the plaintiff in the malpractice case testified that based
on their experience, even if malpractice had been found, they would not have expected
the verdict to exceed the policy limits. Id.
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There is a clear implicit consensus in the cases on this subject
that the duty to consider and weigh all the factors bearing upon
the advisability of a settlement in the interests of the insured is
upon the insurance carrier. Obviously this legal duty is exercised
normally in conjunction with the judgment of counsel defending the
cases against the insured. It is equally obvious to us that neither
the insured [sic] nor counsel can base its legal duty to its insured
solely upon a finding by a medical review committee. .... 45
Thus, Garner presents the somewhat anomalous situation of a
breach of contract based neither on a finding of bad faith nor on a
finding that the excess judgment damages were a result of the breach. 46
A possible explanation for this anomaly is that there was a basic
difference in approaoh between the trial court and the appellate court in
the second suit.
The trial court judged the conduct of the insurer from the facts
existing at the time the insurer made the decision to reject the settlement
demand in the malpractice case. In contrast, it seems that the appellate
court viewed the conduct by looking backward and taking the excess
judgment into account. From such a perspective, it would have been
easy to suggest that the best course of action would have been to accept
the demand. Moreover, without this perspective, it would have been
impossible for the court to say that failing to make an independent
evaluation damaged the insured. 7
Thus, although the court in Garner made no mention of the
propriety of a "hindsight judgment," the conclusion is inescapable that
such an approach was used.
The result is that the Garner decision moved California law a step
closer to what amounts to strict liability in the excess liability situation.
Garner therefore helped to set the stage for the Johansen decision, filed
two years later.
Johansen v. California State Automobile Association
Perhaps the best way to understand the excess liability situation as
it now exists is to contrast the California Supreme Court's opinion in
Johansen v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance
45. Id. at 848, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
46. This decision may cause serious damage to the beneficial use of medical re'view committees in malpractice cases. See Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis:
Is the Medical Review Committee A Viable and Legal Alternative?, 15 SANTA CLA
LAw. 405 (1975).
47. The suggestion that the Garnercourt used a hindsight approach has been made
before: "In essence, the Garner court adopted a new, hindsight approach for determining whether an insured [sic] breached its duty to act in good faith in refusing to settle
an action against its insured." Id. at 418.
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Bureau4498 with the opinion written by Justice Kane in the court of
appeal.
The Johansens, who were injured in an automobile accident,
brought suit against the Dearings who were insured by California State
Automobile Association (the association). Maintaining the automobile
involved in the accident was not covered by the policy, the insurer
instituted a declaratory relief action to determine coverage while still
providing a defense to the insured Dearings.
The Johansens made a policy limits demand which the association
rejected in reliance on its claim of noncoverage. The association did,
however, offer to put the limits in escrow at seven percent interest
pending the outcome of the declaratory relief action. 0
The Johansens were ultimately successful in obtaining judgment
against the Dearings in excess of the policy limits, and the association
paid the limits. The Dearings assigned their rights against the association to the Johansens in exchange for a release of personal liability for
the outstanding excess, as is the common practice in such cases. The
Johansens then sued the association for the excess.
In the declaratory relief action, the trial court decided in favor of
the insurer, finding that there was no policy coverage. On appeal, the
coverage issue was decided against the insurer. 5'
In the second suit, in which the Johansens sued the association for
the excess liability, the trial court found for the insurer. The Johansens
appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed the trial court decision.52
The supreme court reversed, finding liability on the part of the insurer
for the excess on the theory it had failed to accept a reasonable de53
mand.
There are several basic differences between the interpretation given
earlier excess liability cases by Justice Tobriner and the explanation
offered by Justice Kane. For example, Justice Kane appeared to attach
considerable significance to the fact that Comunale involved both the
48. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
49. Johansen v, California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 116 Cal. Rptr. 546
(1974). It is important to note that since the supreme court granted a hearing, the appellate court decision is of no value as precedent in California. CAL. R. CT. Misc. 977.
50. The supreme court did not discuss the good faith implications of this offer.
Apparently such counterproposals will be viewed only as rejections of the settlement demands. See 15 Cal. 3d at 13 n.1, 538 P.2d at 746, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
51. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Dearing, 259 Cal. App. 2d
717, 66 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1968).
52. Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 116 Cal. Rptr. 546

(1974).
53. 15 Cal. 3d at 17, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
ing note 56 infra.

See text accompany-
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failure to accept a reasonable settlement demand and a refusal to
defend. 4 By contrast, Justice Tobriner found this distinction unimportant in judging the conduct of the insurer.5 5 His opinion repeated the
Comunale language that "It]he decisive factor in fixing the extent of
[the insurer's] liability is not the refusal to defend; it is the refusal to
'
accept an offer of settlement within the policy limits."56
A more important difference between the court of appeal decision
and the supreme court decision involves the question of whether it is

necessary to find culpable conduct on the part of the insurer before
liability may be imposed. Basing his conclusion on language in Comunale and Crisci, Justice Kane reasoned that a finding of liability on

the part of the insurer for failure to settle within policy limits must be
founded on the culpability of its conduct. 57 He interpreted Comunale

as indicating that "when the insurer assumes the defense of the insured
it thereby retains control over the litigation and settlement and is there-

fore liable for the entire amount of a judgment against the insured, but
only if in the exercise of such control it is guilty of bad faith in refusing
to settle within the policy limits .
*...58
Justice Kane also supported

his conclusion by interpreting Crisci as specifying that an "unwarranted" rejection of a demand to settle is a prerequisite to liability.59 It was
Justice Kane's opinion
that the meaning of "unwarranted" implied some
60
kind of culpability.
By contrast, Justice Tobriner emphasized that the court in Cbmunale had stated that an insurer denies coverage at its own risk and that,

"if the denial is found to be wrongful it is liable for the full amount
which will compensate the insured for all the detriment caused .... "61
In this regard, Justice Tobriner disagreed with Justice Kane's conclusion
54. "Comunale makes it evident that the insurance company there breached both
its duty to defend and to settle the claim within the policy limits. . . . It follows that,
since in the case at bench respondent assumed the defense of the Dearings in the damage
action, the rule pertaining to a dual breach pronounced in Comunale is inapposite." 116
Cal. Rptr. at 550.
55. 15 Cal. 3d at 17, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
56. Id. at 17, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293, quoting Comunale v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958).
57. Justice Kane stated: "[C]ontrary to appellant's contention, Crisci reaffirms
rather than negates the proposition that the culpability of the insurer is a requisite element of liability based upon its failure to settle within the policy limits." 116 Cal. Rptr.
at 550.
58. Id. at 549, citing Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 660,
328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958).
59. Id. at 550, citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173,
177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967).
60. See note 57 supra.
61. 15 Cal. 3d at 15, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. ,Rptr. at 292, quoting Comunale
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 660, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958).
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that "wrongful" necessarily implied some form of culpability, reasoning
that "an insurer's 'good faith,' though erroneous, belief in noncoverage
affords no defense to liability flowing from the insurer's refusal to accept
a reasonable settlement offer."6' 2 In a preceding footnote he had noted
that "it becomes apparent that a 'wrongful' denial of coverage as used in
Comunale means mereJv an erroneous denial of coverage ....
Moreover, Justice Tobriner emphasized the existence of an independent duty to accept reasonable settlement demands6 4 and concluded
that "the only permissible consideration in evaluating the reasonableneso
of the settlement offer becomes whether, in light of the victim's injuries
and probable liability of the insured, the ultimate judgment is likely to
exceed the amount of the settlement offer."6 5 As will be seen below,
however, this language raising questions of injuries and liability is
probably not a basis for defense on those issues because of the supreme
court's approval of the "hindsight" approach.
The Duty To Accept Reasonable Settlement Demands
If the obligation of an insurance company, then, is to accept
reasonable settlement demands, does there exist a good faith method by
which a demand may be rejected and excess liability avoided by an
insurer? On its face, an absolute duty to accept reasonable settlement
demands would require a jury to determine, at a minimum, whether the
demand made by the plaintiff was reasonable. In this regard, the
reasonableness of the demand would arguably vary with each of the
following factors: 1) the insurer's belief in noncoverage; 2) the likelihood of liability; 3) the extent of probable damages; and 4) the timing
of the settlement demand. For instance, should a demand be considered reasonable if the liability is doubtful; or if the damages appear to
be well below the settlement demand? The answer would appear to be
that the California decisions cited above have systematically done away
with these traditional defenses.
For example, good faith belief in noncoverage, which was present
in Johansen, is simply no longer able to be raised as a defense.66 On its
face, Justice Tobriner's phrase "in light of the victim's injuries and the
62.
63.

15 Cal. 3d at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 16 n.4, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.

64. Id. at n.5.
65. Id. at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
66. The insurer in Johansen attempted to show that it could not be held to the
duty of accepting the demand because there was a legitimate question of coverage, and
it would likely be determined that coverage did not exist. The California court rejected

this argument and held that an insurer's duty to accept reasonable demands remains absolute regardless of such considerations. See id.
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probable liability"'6 7 does seem to suggest that questionable liability or
uncertain injuries could be cited by an insurer as a defense to any excess
liability accruing in the second suit. Nonetheless, if the courts continue
to use the kind of hindsight approach suggested in the discussion of
Garner,6 the value of these defenses will be negated. Moreover, the
court in Johansen approved the hindsight approach 9 as it had been
used in Cain.7" By this method, it appears a court may find that an
insurer has "failed to accept a reasonable settlement offer" if, after a
verdict is reached, the court can look back and determine that had the
insurer accepted the demand, the insured would have been spared
exposure to the excess liability. By approving this approach, the court
in Johansen seems necessarily to have precluded the validity of considering likelihood of liability and the extent of damages in determining
possible defenses for a rejection of a settlement demand. Eliminating
these factors as possible bases for a defense comes quite close to imposing strict liability on the insurer. The only possible defense which
remains concerns the timeliness of the demand. Thus, the relevant
question seems to be: May an insurer assert that a settlement demand is
unreasonable if it is delivered at an early date and open only for a short
time?
In the 1964 decision of Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group,71 the
court said, "The injured party. . . is under no duty to keep negotiations
open after rejection of an early settlement offer." 71 In Critz, the offer
was made even before suit was filed and was open only one week.73 This
language has not subsequently been disapproved and. thus provides at
least some indication that an insurer would have difficulty citing early
timing and short duration of the settlement demand as conclusive evidence that it is unreasonable. In short, the erosion of traditional
defenses regarding the reasonableness of a settlement demand suggests
the approach of a situation in which, from a second suit perspective, all
demands are reasonable.
67. Id.
68. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
69. 15 Cal. 3d at 16-17, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293. See notes 25,
36 & accompanying text supra.
70. See note 36 & accompanying text supra. Justice Kane found such a view totally improper, saying: "The eventuality that after an extensive review the appellate
court reversed the judgment does not ex post facto erase the insurer's good faith belief
in the noncoverage. It is blackletter law that the reasonableness of denial of policy coverage may not be determined by hindsight, but rather with regard to the circumstances
which gave rise to such belief." 116 Cal. Rptr. at 552; see Hodges v. Standard Accident
Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 575, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23-24 (1961).
71. 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964).
72. Id. at 797, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 406 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 798, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
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The Strategic Ineffectuality of Declaratory Relief Actions
Assuming the foregoing is correct, is there any way an insurance
company can refuse a settlement demand and still hope to avoid excess
liability if suoh is the result of the main suit? The answer appears to be
that it can, but only if at some point it has been fully and finally
determined that the insured's policy does not cover the acts in question.
If there is no coverage, there is no contract covering the fact situation;
hence, there are no7 4terms, express or implied, from which to impose
contractual liability.
Coverage can, of course, be finally determined in a declaratory
relief action. Nevertheless, as seen in Johansen, the fact that a coverage question exists and that a declaratory relief action has been initiated
does not offer second suit protection to the insurer, since it is not such
evidence of good faith as will prevent a judgment for the excess against
the insurer."

As a result, many defense counsel now believe that Johansen
demonstrates the necessity of initiating the declaratory relief action as
early as possible. 6 This tactic would naturally prove helpful if the
insurer could establish noncoverage before it had to accept or reject a
settlement demand. Such a result is hard to achieve, however, if the
settlement demand is made early or if the noncoverage determination is
appealed.
Instead, Justice Tobriner -has suggested that in excess exposure
cases, the insurer should first pay the demand and then look to the
insured for reimbursement if the declaratory relief action is finally
resolved in the insurer's favor. 7 The declaratory relief action will thus
be of value in such cases, according to Justice Tobriner,' 7 principally in
74. In this regard, however, it is very important to distinguish actual noncoverage
from good faith belief in noncoverage. As demonstrated in Johansen, the latter is of

little value to the insurer: "Accordingly, contrary to the defendant's suggestion, an insurer's 'good faith,' though erroneous, belief in noncoverage affords no defense to liability flowing from the insurer's refusal to accept a reasonable settlement offer." 15 Cal.
3d at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (footnote omitted). See note 66 &

accompanying text supra.
75. 15 Cal. 3d at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
76. It has also been suggested that early filing of the suit for declaratory relief
will give the insurer a psychological advantage, as the plaintiff will likely pursue the
action less vigorously if there may be a finding of noncoverage. Interview with Michael

J.Brady of Ropers, Majeski, Kohn, Bentley & Wagner, in San Francisco, California, Oct.
7, 1975; Interview with Andre V. Tolpegin of Tolpegin & Imai, in San Francisco, Aug.
29, 1975. Cases such as Johansen, however, indicate that the plaintiff will remain enthusiastic, knowing that with proper timing of the demand, he may force acceptance regardless of the coverage question.

77.
78.

15 Cal. 3d at 19, 538 P.2d at 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
The language in Johansen on the subject of coverage is even more distressing
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making available after the fact recoupment of losses. Such a suit is
analogous to an action for indemnity. Files presenting possible coverage disputes could be turned over to the insurance company's subrogation department for review79 concurrent with the main action. A
company might pay the demand and then, if the subrogation department
feels after an asset investigation of the insured that there is a valid
coverage question, sue for declaratory relief.8 0 The insurer in the main
action could preserve this option through a reservation of rights. This
suggestion, however, is of little value to the insurance company when, in
cases like Johansen,the insured is impecunious.
Aside from enabling the recoupment of losses, which may nonetheless prove to be impossible, an action for declaratory relief presents the
insurer with a difficult ohoice: either it must try to move the action for
declaratory relief to a final conclusion, hoping that the insured does not
appeal, before the settlement demand is withdrawn, or it must reject the
demand and gamble that noncoverage will be established at a later time.
In light of Johansen, it is difficult to be optimistic about either approach.
when coupled with Justice Tobriner's discussion in a previous decision, Gray v. Zurich
Insurance Co. In Gray, Justice Tobriner emphasized that the duty to defend was independent of the duty to indemnify and that an insurer must therefore provide a defense
even if a complaint alleges only intentional conduct, which cannot be covered by a policy of indemnification. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 274, 419 P.2d 168,
175, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 111 (1966). See also Crocker, The Continuing Importance of
Gray v. Zurich, 43 L.A.B. BULL. 239 (1968); Comment, Liability Insurance: Specific
Exclusion of Liability for Injury Intentionally Caused by the Insured, 12 S.D.L. Rnv.
373 (1967); Comment, Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend Suits for Intentional Injury,
24 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 271 (1967); 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 1328 (1967).
79. Most subrogation department work involves paying the insured on a given loss
and thereupon succeeding to the legal right of the insured to pursue a responsible third
party. Subrogation departments, however, also recoup losses in areas that do not actually concern subrogation. For example, if an insurer provides a tax bond, and the
insured defaults, the insurer must pay the state the amount of the default. The subrogation department then approaches the insured for reimbursement for all amounts paid to
the state under the bond.
80. An interesting result of suing for declaratory relief after the demand has been
paid is that the insured loses a powerful ally in that suit. Once the plaintiff has been
paid, he has no reason to join in finding coverage. One writer criticizing the use of
the declaratory relief action doubts that the plaintiff is ever the ally of the insured, stating that "[in a declaratory relief action, the insurer and the injured party are aligned
against the insured." Note, The Role of Declaratory Relief and Collateral Estoppel in
Determining the Insurer's Duty to Defend and Indemnify, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 191, 214
(1969). This assertion is simply not accurate. The plaintiff works to find coverage
to assure that insurance company assets will be available to satisfy a judgment in the
main action, especially if the insured has few assets. No plaintiff's attorney would lose
this "deep pocket" without a fight.
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The Court's Approval of Strict Liability
A further indication that the supreme court may have in fact
adopted strict liability is the clear approval with which the court has
viewed the doctrine in this context. For example, in Crisci, the court
discussed the advantages of such a doctrine as follows:
[T]he rejection of a settlement within the limits where there is any
danger of a judgment in excess of the limits can be justified, if at
all, only on the basis of interests of the insurer, and, in light of the
common knowledge that settlement is one of the usual methods by
which an insured receives protection under a liability policy, it may
not be unreasonable for an insured who purchases a policy with
limits to believe that a sum of money equal to the limits is available and will be used so as to avoid liability on his part with regard
to any covered accident.8 '
The court reasoned that if such is the insured's expectation, an
insurance company should be willing to absorb whatever losses result
from the rejection of a settlement demand, since it is the insurance
company that stands to gain by the rejection. 2
After explaining that the proposed rule would eliminate the necessity of determining whether or not a demand was reasonable and would
remove any temptation to gamble with the insured's assets, the court
concluded:
Finally, and most importantly, there is more than a small
amount of elementary justice in a rule that would require that, in
this situation where the insurer's and insured's interests necessarily
conflict, the insurer, which may reap the benefits of its determina83
tion not to settle, should also suffer the detriments of its decision.
Thus, in explicating another way to find for the insured, the court
in Crisci indicated its approval of a system of strict liability, even though
the decision was not expressly dependent on such a system. The
plaintiff in Johansen made similar arguments for strict liability. There,
the court indicated that such arguments were "well reasoned" but
inapposite" because "the excess judgment may be predicated on [the
insurer's] rejection of a reasonable settlement offer."8' 5
81. 66 Cal. 2d at 430-31, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See note 2 supra.
84. The court stated: "Both plaintiff and amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiff urge
that we hold that whenever an insurer receives an offer to settle within policy limits
and rejects it, the insurer should be held liable in every case for the amount of any final
judgment. . . . In light of our conclusion that defendant's liability for the excess judgment may be predicated on its rejection of a reasonable settlement offer, we need not
resolve this issue." 15 Cal. 3d at 17 n.6, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
85. Id. The California court apparently read a New Jersey case as having adopted
a doctrine of strict liability in that state. Actually, while the New Jersey case quoted
at great length from Crisci and indicated approval of such a doctrine, it did not adopt
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Summary

As demonstrated in the above discussion, the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing has become an absolute duty to accept
reasonable settlement demands. Liability for amounts in excess of the

policy limits may be imposed without any finding of bad faith or
culpable conduct on the part of the insurer. It might be argued that the

California courts have still not imposed strict liability as a matter of law
because they still ostensibly require at least a determination that a

settlement demand is reasonable. Nevertheless, given the erosion of the
traditional defenses of belief in noncoverage, questionable damages or
liability, and unreasonable timing of the demand, it is difficult to dismiss
the notion that from a second suit perspective, all demands are reasonable. Finally, the fact that the supreme court views the doctrine of strict

liability favorably forces the conclusion that as a practical matter, if an
insurer does not accept a demand which is within the policy limits, it
will almost certainly be liable for any excess judgment.

The result,

then, looks very much like an unannounced doctrine of strict liability for

failure to settle. 8 6

Strict Liability: Two Key Advantages
If it is the case that virtual strict liability has been imposed by the

decisions in Johansen and its predecessors, one important ancillary
benefit which should result is the elimination of the traditional conflict
of interest problem in this area. As stated at the outset, whenever there

is a demand to settle within the policy limits, it is in the insured's
interests to accept. On the other hand, it is often true that settling at
such a figure will be actuarially unsound for the insurer. Because
rejection of the demand will expose the insured to a possible excess
it outright. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 502, 323
A.2d 495, 510 (1974).
The New Jersey Supreme Court did indicate in Rova Farms that if in some case
it could not hold an insurer liable in any other way, it might invoke strict liability: "But
since this court as all other courts, seeks to prevent the law from inflicting unjust results,
it is not discordant with its obligation, to forsee the probability [of invoking a rule of
strict liability]." Id. at 502, 323 A.2d at 510.
It seems that New Jersey's position is much like that of California, in that the court
has expressed that it favors the doctrine but has decided, for the present, against announcing a rule of strict liability as such.
86. Another factor which strengthens a strict liability argument is the fact that
Comunale, Crisci, and Johansen were all unanimous supreme court decisions. In the
excess liability area, in a case involving the rejection of a settlement within policy limits
offer, an insurer has not prevailed in a published appellate decision since 1961, in
Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1961).
Because the court in Hodges found the hindsight approach unacceptable, it is unlikely
that it is still good law. Id. at 575, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

verdict, at this point in the suit the interests of the insured are, in some
respects, aligned with those of the plaintiff. 87 This coincidence of

interests is the source of what sometimes amounts to collusion.
Conflict of interest problems are evident in Johansen, in which the
plaintiff's attorney engaged in a fee splitting arrangement with the
insured's attorney. 88 It is precisely this sort of situation which a system
of strict liability would eliminate. If the insured felt that his interests
were being sacrificed by his insurer, he would tend to be receptive to the
plaintiffs advances and might even provide early cooperation in second
suit preparation. In contrast, an insured who knew that his insurer
would be absolutely liable for any excess should it reject a demand
would have no incentive to defect to the side of the plaintiff if a demand
were made to settle within the limits. A second advantage is that a
system of strict liability would dispense with the second suit entirely,
since the purpose of this suit is solely to determine the insurer's liability
for excess.89
87. See Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1973). Merritt was a bad faith action against an insurer for an excess verdict in which
there had been no demand to settle within the policy limits. As a result, the court reasoned that there had never been a conflict of interest, since the interests of the insured
and the insurer had at all times been parallel. The issue of the insurer's bad faith in
relation to the insured had never arisen. Id. at 877, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 523-24. A petition for a hearing by the California Supreme Court was denied; however, Justices Tobriner, Mosk, and Sullivan were of the opinion that the petition should have been
granted. See id. at 884, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
88. 15 Cal. 3d at 21 n.12, 538 P.2d at 752, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 296. At one point
the arrangement was for an equal split of a 75% contingent fee. Appellant's Answer
to Respondent's Petition for a Rehearing by the Supreme Court at 6, Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 752, 123 Cal. Rptr.
288 (1975). Respondent insurer argued that this fee arrangement meant that the insured's personal attorney had a financial interest in a judgment against his own client
and further argued that the collusive conduct of the attorneys was, in fact, the "proximate cause" of the excess verdict. Respondent said that because an attorney is the agent
of his client, the attorney's conduct is imputed to the client. Respondent's Petition for
a Rehearing by the Supreme Court at 6. Appellant answered, however, that because
the insured Dearing family was impecunious, the insured's personal attorney had a financial interest not in a verdict against his client, but rather in the insurance proceeds. Appellant's Answer to Respondent's Petition for a Rehearing by the Supreme Court at 6.
Appellant answered the agency argument by suggesting that the fee arrangement was
outside the scope of authority and that therefore the clients were not bound. Id. at 8.
89. It may be that imposing strict liability in this way would raise substantial constitutional questions. It has been suggested that strict liability would constitute an "impairment of contract obligations" prohibited by article I, section 10 of the United States
Constitution. See Amicus Curiae Brief On Behalf of Defendant and Respondent at 27,
Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744,
123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); ci. Belanger v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 89 F. Supp. 736
(E.D. La. 1950), afj'd, 188 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1951); Federal Land Bank v. Garrison,
185 S.C. 255, 193 S.E. 308 (1937); Engelcke v. Farmer's State Bank, 61 S.D. 92, 246

March 19761

SETrLEMENT-INSURER'S STRICT LIABILITY

913

Strict Liability: One Possible Drawback
One of the most unsatisfactory effects of strict liability in the
context of current case law is that the plaintiff may make a demand very
early, even before filing suit, and by so doing expose the insurer to
excess liability if the demand is refused. The threat of this exposure
provides leverage which can, of course, be abused if a plaintiff makes
the demand at a very early stage, when a defendant insurer lacks
sufficient information to make a proper evaluation of the claim.90
Therefore, it is essential that the doctrine of strict liability in this area be
tempered in order to minimize the sort of abuse illustrated by the
hypothetical situation below.
Suppose someone slips and falls on the insured's property. The
insured carries a comprehensive liability insurance policy with $100,000
liability limits. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiff's attorney writes a letter
to the insured's liability insurance carrier advising that the plaintiff has
ruptured a disc and requires a lumbar laminectomy with fusion; that the
plaintiff has, thus far, $3,000 in medical specials; 91 that documentation
of present and future medical specials will be forwarded when received;
and that the plaintiff therefore makes a demand to settle for the policy
limits, which demand must be accepted by the insurer within ten days.
The attorney further indicates that rejection of the settlement demand
will be viewed as an act of bad faith. This threat is not an empty one,
for since Johansen, an insurer who refuses such a demand takes a
substantial risk of being held for the excess, if any, awarded by a jury in
the main suit.
At this point, the insurer must assign counsel, assign an adjustor,
establish reserves,92 and, in appropriate cases, keep the home office and
N.W. 288 (1932). If there are valid constitutional questions, the court should have addressed the issue before allowing the virtual state of strict liability that now exists in
the law.
90. The careful plaintiff generally delivers with a demand the basic information
needed by the defendant insurer to evaluate the claim. This procedure protects the
plaintiff by preventing the defendant from raising the argument that information was
withheld and a proper evaluation thus prohibited. Interview with Robert T. Lynch of
Ericksen, Ericksen, Lynch, Mackenroth & Arbuthnot, in San Francisco, California, Sept.
3, 1975. Nevertheless, decisions like Johansen, Garner and Cain, which come so close
to strict liability, coupled with the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys envision expanded use
of the tort of bad faith, have tended to increase plaintiff confidence in this area. See
California Continuing Education of the Bar, New Tort Remedies In Insurance Cases,
Program Material, Oct.-Nov. 1974.
91. Special damages are "[ihose which are the actual, but not the necessary, result of the injury complained of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate
consequence in the particular case . .

. ."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 469 (4th ed. rev.

1968). In this context, the term "medical specials" refers to all medical bills resulting
from the incident in question.
92. Insurance carriers are required to estimate the possible value of each claim
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the insured apprised of developments. At the same time, it must
perform all of the other necessary duties involved in opening and
handling a claim file.
If the demand is accepted, it will almost certainly be accepted
without adequate evaluation of the case by defense counsel. A ruptured
disc treated by a lumbar laminectomy with fusion could result in a
plaintiffs verdict of as little as $100 or as much as $350,000.11 The
liability question, professional evaluation of the injuries, and even the
issue of policy coverage itself could be considered in a cursory manner at
best.
Clearly the maxim that the law favors settlements should not be
extended this far. There is a need for a method of placing sensible
limits on the leverage that Johansen and its predecessors now afford to
the plaintiff.
Toward a Workable System of Strict Liability for
Failure To Settle
The result of the trend of the cases culminating in Johansen is that
it has become considerably easier for a plaintiff to recover, often without
trial. Because a plaintiff can, to a large extent, determine the time at
which the insurer will be held to excess liability, it seems proper that
reasonable bounds be placed on that leverage.
Appropriate legislation establishing a "point of excess liability"
would be a useful first step. Such a scheme would fix a particular time
at which an insurer could deliver the policy limits without being held
liable for more. For example, the excess exposure point could be set at
120 days after the date of the within-limits demand or 5 days after the
pretrial settlement conference, or the first day of trial, whichever date4
9
came first. Such a point would allow an insurer to evaluate carefully
carefully and set aside (reserve) that amount. Money thus reserved is not free for investment and speculation. This measure provides protection for claimants in the event
that a company experiences financial difficulties. The reserves will be available to pay
off the claims. Interview with B.E. Merrill, Casualty Claims Manager, Central Mutual
Insurance Company, in San Francisco, California, Mar. 20, 1975.
93. Id. on Sept. 4, 1975. Mr. Merrill stated that the figures were obtained from
some fifty-eight California jury verdicts over the last four years dealing with the same
injury and treatment.
94. "ne plaintiff should be required to make available to the insurer during this
period the basic information needed to make an intelligent decision concerning the offer.
Such information would include medical data relating to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. Although this requirement would raise some tricky procedural problems, one possible way of bringing about the desired result would be to have the judge in the personal
injury suit monitor the disclosure in something like a modified discovery proceeding to
prevent the plaintiff from withholding necessary information until the time period for
accepting the demand expired.
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and, if it decided the danger of excess liability was too substantial,
deliver the policy limits before the excess exposure point was reached. If,
on the other hand, the insurer concluded that the value of the claim was
well within the policy limits, it could proceed to trial, but it would have
to accept any excess liability which resulted.
Note that this sort of scheme would eliminate the conflict of
interest described above95 and at the same .time allow the insurer to
make intelligent, professional evaluations of the merits of the plaintiff's
demand. Moreover, establishing a point of excess exposure by legislation or judicial decision would put an end to undue pressure by plaintiffs
without compromising the merits of the plaintiffs' cases.
One significant drawback to such a plan, however, is that in a case
of obvious liability, damages, and coverage, an insurer which was quite
aware that it would be required to pay the limits could in any event wait
120 days before doing so. Thus, the plaintiff could be required to wait
until the point of excess exposure before being paid. Nonetheless, such
difficulty in a few situations would almost certainly not outweigh the
advantages which would derive from the proposed scheme in the great
majority of cases. Moreover, in view of the amount of time that
personal injury suits usually consume, 120 days would not seem to be an
inordinately long period to require the plaintiff to wait.
To incorporate the doctrine of strict liability in this area is to
require the insurance industry to assume unlimited liability, regardless
of contract limits specified. Therefore, it would seem to be a proper
compromise to establish a point of excess exposure in order to help
counterbalance that increased responsibility. Such a scheme could be
implemented by legislation like that set out below:
Excess Liability
Whenever a demand to settle within the policy limits is received, an
insurer shall either accept such a demand within the statutory period or
be absolutely liable for a plaintiff's entire judgment. Such an offer shall
be made by registered mail or by any other vehicle providing proof of
receipt.
There shall be no excess liability exposure on the part of an insurer
if there has been no such settlement demand.
Of course, if a demand were made before suit was filed, policing the situation to
ensure the delivery of necessary evaluation information in conjunction with the demand
would remain a serious problem. Highly specialized firms perform this function as a
matter of course, but there is no easy solution for the plaintiff's attorney who is dabbling
in the excess liability area for the first time.
95. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
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Point of Excess Exposure

The point at which an insurer may be spared excess liability by
paying the policy limits or an agreed settlement within those limits shall
be 120 days after the insurer has received a settlement demand, or 5
days after the pretrial conference, or the first day of trial, whichever
shall occur first, provided that in no event shall the insurer have less
than 48 hours in which to consider a demand.
A plaintiff may withdraw a settlement demand at any time before
the demand has been accepted. If a demand has been withdrawn, the
excess exposure time period will start over at the time that another
demand is made.
Mark Goodall*
*
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